Refugees Integration and National Security Risks in Tanzania: A Case of Katumba Old Settlement

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Abstract
Tanzania integrated 162,156 refugees in 2010, but integration risks to national security have not been given sufficient attention. This paper examines the national security risks of integrating refugees. The study adopted a case study design mixing both qualitative and quantitative methods. It drew data from 31 key informants and a sample of 397 integrated refugees and native Tanzanians in Katumba Old Settlement. The study found that integrated refugees engage in criminal activities that pose significant national security risks to both Tanzania and their country of origin. Such activities include illegal possession and proliferation of firearms and military weapons and supporting conflicts in their country of origin. It concludes that, such activities are likely to trigger diplomatic tensions and increase the costs of countering armed crime and extreme violence in the country. The study recommends a re-evaluation of the refugee integration strategy. This may include re-evaluating the current approach to refugee integration, improving security models and resettlement plans and implementing cultural integration strategies.

Keywords
Refugee Integration, Naturalisation, National Security Risks, Refugee, Katumba Old Settlement, Tanzania

1. Introduction
Refugee integration has attracted attention in international relations, politics, and refugee studies and practice. This is because it is immensely politically sensitive and often contested, especially by states and local communities that often fear integrating refugees may weaken the country's social fabric (UNHCR, 2013a; O'Callaghan & Sturge, 2018). Consequently, in several countries, there has been an increase in nationalistic and anti-refugee integration parties and movements. Examples include the Freedom Party in Austria, the National Front in France, Brexit in the United Kingdom and the Alternative Party in Germany (Chassany, 2015; Hynie, 2018a, 2018b; Abdou & Ruedin, 2022)

The history of refugee integration can be traced back to the hostile experience of post-World War II, where in Western European countries, millions of refugees were displaced,
Refugee Integration

deported and kept in camps. Refugees experienced protracted problems including unsatisfactory education, lack of employment, protection and freedom of movement (UNHCR, 2018). Following this hostile experience, the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol announced three solutions to solve the problems that refugees face while in camps. These were voluntary repatriation to their country of origin, refugee integration in the host country, and relocation arrangements to a third country (UNHCR, 2003a; Mayblin, 2010). However, in 2005, the UNHCR-Executive Committee suggested that the solutions for addressing refugees’ problems should transcend the three traditional solutions. It was recommended that governments accepting refugee integration should treat integrated refugees (IRs) with dignity and respect, avoid all forms of discrimination and encourage inclusion (UNHCR, 2005). The host government are required to provide IRs with almost the same rights and opportunities as citizens including protection, travel documents, education, health services, political participation, rights to movement and employment, or even naturalising them, to mention but a few (Ager & Strang, 2008; Council of the European Union, 2009; UNHCR, 2013a; Coley, et al., 2019).

Recent statistics show that, over the past decade, the number of individuals forced to flee their homes has increased almost yearly. UNHCR reports indicate the number of refugees worldwide increased from 27.1 million in 2021 to 35.3 million at the end of 20221. Africa has been home to about 30 million internally displaced persons, asylum seekers and refugees, which is almost one-third of the world's refugee population2. According to Fielden (2008), Africa has some of the most open borders and welcoming policies towards refugees than anywhere in the world. However, the long-term presence of refugee populations in the majority of the developing world is seen as a source of insecurity by many host states. As a result, host governments have endorsed policies to hold refugees in isolated and insecure camps.

Integrating refugees may bring several economic benefits to the host country, especially by expanding the host’s labour force (Gomez et al., 2010). However, the global experience of admission and integration of refugees suggests mixed reactions, practices and outcomes. Refugee populations are progressively perceived as sources of insecurity for Western states (Loescher & Milner, 2005). In certain areas, Refugee camps have been the breeding grounds for international terrorism and rebel movements (Choi & Salehyan, 2013). Also, Loescher & Milner (2005) stress that some refugees habitually take advantage of the presence of refugees to take part in actions that subvert host states. For instance, citing experiences in Greece, the European Migration Network (2006) shows refugee integration resulted in increased crimes and security threats. The United States of America tragedy, popularly known as September 11, also increased the fear of integrating refugees for security reasons (Adelman, 2002; Cianciarulo, 2007). Consequently, anti-refugee sentiments and xenophobic attitudes have been on the rise (UNHCR, 2013a). Sweden, for instance, is regarded as one the countries with high xenophobia on refugee integration (ibid.). In Africa, countries such as Kenya and South Africa, refugee integration is not recommended for security reasons. Local community members also claim refugees are job competitors, integrating them is considered a burden on government financial resources (O’Callaghan & Sturge, 2018).

Over the past decades, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya have experienced a large number of asylum seekers from various conflict areas in the eastern and central African regions. As of 2018, there were more than 2.2 million refugees in these countries with Uganda hosting about 1.4 million refugees, followed by Kenya with just below 500,000 refugees and Tanzania with

2 https://www.unhcr.org/about-unhcr/where-we-work/africa, Re-accessed, 26th December, 2023
over 350,000. The UNHCR report indicates that the number of refugees has increased (UNHCR, 2022), Uganda has departed from the dominant refugee response model of housing refugees in large camps (International Rescue Committee (IRC), 2018). Moreover, IRC (2018) delineates that Uganda has adopted an integrated settlements approach in which refugees and host communities cohabit and share common services. However, IRs in Uganda are associated with increasing insecurity arising from militarisation and the economic and environmental burdens on the country, and they are blamed for a variety of social ills and problems affecting the local population (IRC, 2018).

Despite the anticipated adverse effects of integrating refugees, Tanzania seems to be the most lenient on refugee admission and mass refugee integration (Fielden, 2008; Ongpin, 2008). The country is listed as the leading in the continent to undergo refugee admission, mass integration and even mass naturalisation. For instance, the available evidence shows that, between 1959 and early 1960s, Tanzania received a substantial number of refugees from other African countries seeking protection due to anti-colonial wars, intra-ethnic conflicts or political repression (Gasarasi 1990; Chaulia, 2003; Fielden, 2008; Miller, 2011). Similarly, in the 1980s, for example, approximately 30,000 Rwandese refugees were naturalised (Gasarasi 1990). The naturalised Rwandese were then integrated into Kimuli village in Karagwe District, Muyenzi and Kanyinya villages in Ngara District, and Mwese village in Tanganika District. Likewise, Brendan & Evaline, (2009) noted that in 1999 about 1,300 Somali refugees were naturalised and 1,500 citizenship applications were in progress. In 2003, more than 3,300 Somali Bantu refugees were granted citizenship and further integrated within Chogo village, Handeni District (UNHCR, 2003b; URT, 2004).

Moreover, on 15th April 2010, Tanzania naturalised 162,156 Burundian refugees (URT, 2019a). The aim was to abide by UNHCR’s long-term refugee durable solution. However, not all host communities in Tanzania accepted with refugee naturalisation in 2010. The citizens in the Kasanda ward in the Kigoma Region complained that the government did not consult them before granting citizenship to Burundian refugees otherwise they would have refused (Danish Refugees Council, 2017). Furthermore, Rwezaula (2022) puts forward that, the refugees’ influx in Tanzania is the source of community tension, security tension and an insecure environment. Following the increasing number of naturalised refugees, concerns began looming, especially on the issue of national security (Kuch, 2016; Danish Refugee Council, 2017; Kuch, 2018).

Mass naturalisation of such a large number of refugees in Tanzania has been cited as a historical and extraordinary phenomenon that has never happened elsewhere in the world (Kuch 2016, 2018; Ogude et al., 2018). Yet, scholars and institutions such as the World Bank & UNHCR indicate inadequate research, knowledge and information on the effect of refugee integration in Tanzania (Ongpin, 2008; Kuch, 2018; Ogude et al., 2018). This raises the question of the security risks posed by refugee integration. Also, UNHCR, (2013b & 2013c) has emphasised that countries approving refugee integration require careful planning and extra commitment to realize long-term viable positive outcomes and avoid associated national security threats. It is from this background this paper focuses on examining the national security risks associated with integrated refugees in Tanzania. Most of the discourses on refugee integration focus on prevailing tensions between host communities and asylum seekers and integrated or naturalised refugees (Howarth & Ibrahim, 2012). Other studies, particularly (Kuch, 2016; 2018), focused on tangible and intangible values of citizenship acquisition and land rights of naturalised populations. Thus, there is scanty knowledge of the potential or actual risks that mass refugee integration poses to national security. This paper, therefore, contributes to this knowledge gap. The rest of the paper covers the study’s theoretical framework, methodology, findings and conclusion.
2. Theoretical Framework

Conceptually, refugee integration is a difficult concept to define and a complex phenomenon to apply. The concept itself “lacks any formal definition in international refugee law” (UNHCR 2013b:10. & 2013a:13). In conceptual terms, refugee integration is viewed as the dynamic and complex undertaking that requires efforts from parties including refugees themselves to adopt and obey the host community’s values without losing their cultural identity (UNHCR, 2005). However, the complexities of contextual differences among states make the operationalisation of the term under international refugee law more difficult (UNHCR, 2013b:10. & 2013a:13). Sometimes, refugee integration and naturalisation are used interchangeably, while in other instances, they do not mean the same. Naturalisation is viewed as a process of granting citizenship to foreigners, including refugees, who meet the citizenship laws and procedures of a particular country. Naturalisation always comes with citizenship rights and enjoyment of whatever opportunities may be granted by the government to a citizen of a specific nation, including free protection, free education, political participation, health care, national passport, freedom of movement and employment (UNHCR, 2005). Therefore, a naturalised refugee becomes a legalised citizen (de jure) of a country and automatically enjoys all the services mentioned above. In other contexts, refugee integration may be restricted to the enjoyment of economic rights. In this case, an integrated refugee is accorded a special status that may guarantee him/her economic freedom while retaining his/her original citizenship. Therefore, refugee naturalisation may be viewed as the highest level of refugee integration.

In Tanzania and the context of this study, an integrated refugee is a citizen, formerly a refugee, who enjoys all the rights and bears the responsibilities stipulated by the country’s laws. Refugee integration is thus, a process by which former refugees become naturalised and incorporated into local communities. Therefore, when a refugee becomes legally integrated into the local community as a citizen of the country, automatically enjoys all the rights as stipulated by the host country’s laws (Laurent, 2023). In this article, and just for the purposes of analytical distinctions between naturalised refugees and the natives, the former citizens will be referred to as Integrated Refugees (IRs) and the latter as Native Tanzanians (NTs).

The relationship between refugee integration and national security can be well understood within the regional security context. From the Regional Security Complex theoretical point of view, integrating refugee from a neighbouring country may pose serious security risks especially when IRs live in proximity to their country of origin. The Regional Security Complex Theory underlines the security interdependence between neighbouring states (Buzan & Waever, 2003). The basic assumption of the theory is that security interdependence is patterned into regional-based groupings. Thus, countries in higher risks to insecurity when their neighbours are in conflict or insecure situations. This is because military threats move more easily within a short-distance area than a long distance, and insecurity is often associated with proximity (Buzan et al., 1998). Thus, conflicts first affect the neighbours and later other regions (Miall, et al., 2001).

The concept of national security is often taken for granted, but it may also mean different things to different people. National security had been originally conceived as protection against military attack. However currently, national security is broadly understood to also embrace non-military dimensions, including security from terrorism, minimisation of crime, economic security, food security, energy security, environmental security, and cyber-security (Fusiek,2020; Şengöz,2022). Others have conceptualised it as freedom from military threats and political intimidation (Romm, 1993; Paleri, 2008). National security is also viewed as the ability of a country to preserve its physical integrity and territory; uphold its economic
relationships with the rest of the world, on practical terms, protect its nature, institution, and governance from external distraction, and control its borders (Brown, 1983). According to Maier (1990), national security is the capacity to influence domestic and foreign conditions that a given community believes necessary to relish its freedom, autonomy, prosperity, and well-being. A nation shall either be insecure or secure but cannot have partial security. If a nation is only half secure, it is not secure at all (General Jacob L. Devers n.d cited in Baldwin, 1997: 14). Similarly, Baldwin notes that the term national security is used to explain the protection of core values for national interest.

However, Degaut & Meacham, (2015) view national security synonymously with national interest. This way national security is conceived as a strategy government uses to guide, organise and unify all citizens, to prevent and disrupt external enemies, and to protect citizens, critical infrastructure and vital national values. In the context of the Tanzania National Security Act, No. 3 of 1970 and the Tanzania Defence Act, No 24 of 1966, national security refers to the protection of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) from acts of espionage, sabotage and subversion, whether or not it is directed from or intended to be committed within the URT. Thus, this paper draws from Degaut & Meacham's (2015) definition, the Tanzania Defence Act, No. 24 of 1966 and the Tanzania National Security Act, No. 3 of 1970 conceptions to define national security as a protection of national interest, including the state, citizens, critical infrastructure such as airports, entry points like borders, military bases and vital national values from espionage, sabotage and subversion. Any activity, behaviour or practice by an individual, a group or a foreign government that can endanger or raise conditions for endearing any of these is thus a national security risk.

While the Regional Security Complex Theory provides valuable insights into the complexities of security dynamics, it may have limitations in fully explaining the level of national security threats in Africa. However, Walsh (2021), pinpoints five potential inadequacies of this theory: First, Diverse Security Challenges: Africa is a vast and diverse continent with a wide range of security challenges, including interstate conflicts, civil wars, terrorism, transnational crime, and resource-related conflicts. The Regional Security Complex Theory may struggle to encompass the breadth and complexity of these diverse security threats. Second, Weak Regional Institutions: In many African regions, regional institutions and mechanisms for conflict resolution and security cooperation are often weak or insufficiently developed. The theory's assumptions about regional integration and cooperation may not fully align with the realities on the ground, limiting its explanatory power. Third, Power Asymmetries: African states often exhibit significant power asymmetries, with some states exerting more influence and control over regional dynamics than others. The Regional Security Complex Theory may not adequately address the power imbalances and how they shape security threats and responses in the region. Fourth, Historical and Colonial Legacies: Africa's security challenges are often rooted in historical and colonial legacies, including artificial borders, ethno-linguistic divisions, and resource exploitation. The theory may not capture these factors. Fifth, External Actors: The theory primarily focuses on regional dynamics among states, but it may not fully grasp the influence of external actors in shaping national security threats in Africa. Factors such as foreign interventions, arms trafficking, and economic exploitation by external actors can significantly impact regional security dynamics. Notwithstanding these limitations, the Regional Security Complex Theory offers a useful framework for analysing IRs' security risks. It is important to note that theories are not meant to explain all contexts or problems and their theoretical limitations do not make them entirely inadequate.
3. Methodology

The study was conducted in Katumba Old Settlement, Mpanda District, Katavi Region, western Tanzania. The settlement, established in 1973, consists of three administrative blocks, A, B and C, each containing various villages (Figure 1). Katumba Old Settlement was picked randomly from among the country’s three old refugee settlements, namely, Ulyankulu, Katumba and Mishamo. Respectively, three pieces of paper were marked with the letters U, K, and M, folded, and placed in the cup. And one of the pieces marked “K” was picked randomly.

Katumba Old Settlement includes members with unique population characteristics. These are the naturalised refugees who possess their citizenship certificates. Second is a group of former refugees with authorised citizenship but have not picked their certificates (URT, 2019b). Third are persons who opted to continue with refugee status. The fourth group consists of refugees with undecided refugee status (URT, 2015), and the fifth is a group of native Tanzanians. Undecided refugees are those who did not opt for any of the three alternatives given in 2007, which included deciding for voluntary repatriation back to their country of origin, applying for Tanzanian citizenship, or maintaining refugee status.

The study adopted a pragmatic approach, mixing both qualitative and quantitative methods. The data collection methods included a survey, in-depth interviews with key informants, focus group discussion (FGD), and documentary review. The sample size for the survey was 397 respondents, determined by Cochran’s formula (1953) based on 70,955 total population of the people living in Katumba Old Settlement. Amongst the survey respondents, 53 were native Tanzanians and 344 were integrated or naturalised refugees of Burundi origin. A total of 31 key informants were interviewed, including participants from the Tanzania Department of Refugees Services, Tanzania Immigration Department, Tanzania People’s Defence Force, Regional Reserve Forces Advisors, Regional Security Committee, Tanzania Police Force, Tanzania Forest Services Agency, Regional Patrol Task Force, Village Executive Officers, UNHCR –Refugee Protection Section, and IRs elders. Interviews helped gain a deeper understanding of respondents’ experience of national security risks posed by integrated refugees.

Two FGDs were conducted. The FGD members comprised eight participants recruited from various groups and institutions. The first FGD had four women and four men while the second had three women and five men. Each group had one member representing NGOs, two
members were native Tanzanians, three members were integrated refugees and two were experts in refugees and security issues in the study area. Generally, all FGD participants had vast experience and knowledge concerning IRs in the study area. The quantitative data obtained were analysed descriptively using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software while content analysis was used to analyse interviews and FGDs data. The data gathered from different sources were used to triangulate survey results.

4. National Security Risks
The study examined the national security risk posed by IRs in Tanzania. Since national security risks may constitute myriad issues, some of which may be unrelated to this study, the Regional Security Complex Theory served as a guiding framework to identify and examine the most relevant security risks. Specifically, the study examined the probability of IRs to possess illegal firearms and extent of military weapons proliferation in settlement area, and the probability of them supporting conflicts in their country of origin. As earlier discussed in this paper, the theory focuses on proximity as a key determinant factor. In this regard, the study assumed that refugees who flee their country of origin because of insecurity are likely to become a source of insecurity both in the host and home country as they come with their hatred and revenge sentiments against those who caused them to flee. The risks are more likely to become serious when refugees’ country of origin and the host are within proximity. This is because proximity facilitates their continuous participation in the political activities of their country of origin. Some IRs can establish firearms and military weapons supply routes and send remittances to support illegal activities and military operations in their country of origin. They may also use the host country for political espionage and commit associated crimes. When poorly managed, refugee integration can be a source of insecurity for both countries. The subsequent sections present and discuss findings on each of the key security issues identified above.

4.1 Proliferation of firearms and military weapons
Respondents were asked in the survey to state the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statement that IRs possessed illegal firearms. The responses were assessed on a scale of 1 to 5, with a mid-value of 3 and 5 indicating “strongly agree”. Thus any mean value equal to or greater than 3, indicates IR risks to Tanzania’s national security. The findings reveal a non-significant difference ($\chi^2 (4) = 7.0126, p > .05$) between the views of the IRs and their NTs counterparts. As indicated in Table 1. About 6.69% of IRs disagreed, 22.97% were neutral and 70.34% agreed. Meanwhile, 5.66% of NTs disagreed, 7.55% were neutral and 86.79% agreed that IRs possess illegal firearms. Overall, 72.55% of all respondents in the study ($M = 3.8086$) agreed that IRs possess illegal firearms. These findings show that IRs and NTs have similar views on IRs’ illegal possession of firearms. Illegally possessed firearms increase the threat of violent crimes. This implies a threat to national security. For instance, during in-depth interviews, a respondent revealed that incidents of insecurity were high in the region, as he said, “In this region, travelling at night is forbidden because of increased incidences of car hijacking; many people who travel at night without police escort may be easily attacked.” (In-depth interview no. 31, 16th October 2020).
Table 1: IRs Illegal Possession of Firearms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Some IRs possess illegal firearms.</th>
<th>IRs</th>
<th>NTs</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>344</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean = 3.8086, SD = .8490

**Pearson chi2 (4) = 7.0126, p = .135**

Source: Field data (Sep, 2020–Feb, 2021)

In-depth interviews with IRs elders revealed reasons for illegal possession of firearms. Interviewees mentioned that IRs who possess firearms intend to seek revenge on anyone who has caused them pain and affected their lives. Some of them still think of returning back to Burundi to revenge against the Tutsi, believing that the Tutsi are the reason for them to flee from their country of origin. It was also revealed that among IRs, possession of firearms is a matter of protection and prestige, a sense of being a man. An interviewee asserted:

Possession of firearms is a sign of prestige for some IRs as it makes them be considered as real strong men...Because of bad memories and insecurity situations in Burundi IRs possess firearms because they don't know who their enemy is. IRs possess weapons for self-protection...also, for some of us to own firearms and military weapons indicates one's prosperity in life (In-depth interview no. 6, 12th October, 2020).

The findings suggest IRs continue to feel a sense of insecurity despite many years of living in a relatively secure environment. A sense of insecurity may be a security risk by itself as it may trigger violent behaviour. Possession of firearms is not common in Tanzania’s culture, though a citizen may acquire a gun lawfully. Pride in possessing firearms among IRs probably explains the proliferation of firearms and military weapons in Katavi where Katumba Old Settlement is located. For instance, the 2020 crime statistics report shows that Katavi topped the list of regions with the highest number of cases of illegal possession of firearms by recording 22 cases (URT, 2021).

Furthermore, evidence from other sources confirms this study’s findings. Katavi's Region Police Investigation Crime Report of 2020 shows that in the last seven years, from 2013-2020 in Katumba Old Settlement, 34 IRs were arrested for possessing 42 military weapons and 13 ammunition (URT, 2021). The report further indicates that a special task force operation was done for 20 days, from 7th-27th to February 2020. This operation, popularly known as “Safisha Katumba na Mishamo,” led to the seizure of 53 military weapons and 11 ammunitions in Katumba. The types of weapons seized include 3 G3s (semi-automatic centrefire pistons, 13 submachine guns (SMG) (handgun fully automatic carbines) and 33 muzzleloaders3 (The Daily News, 27th February 2020; AZAM TV News of 29th February 2020). Other weapons seized in the operations in Katumba include hard ropes of various sizes, hard nets and wire ropes of several sizes. It was also reported that in 2019 the police in the Katavi

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3 These are handguns made with both pistols and revolvers, enable several shots to be fired without reloading
4 https://youtu.be/3fUTbyFOFVk?si=qixZA_mlqNXGp1m-, Accessed 12th October 2020
region seized four military weapons, four muzzleloaders and four AK-47 (Yinglun, 2019). This may signify that the Katumba area is an armoury of its kind and the proliferation of military weapons in the area might not be questionable. FGD findings also supported these results as FGD participants revealed:

During the twenty days of operation, all 17 suspects were new Tanzanians (IRs) of Burundi origin. The reasons for the illegal possession of military weapons and other weapons were chiefly for self-protection, especially in the forest during animal poaching, illegal lumbering, and charcoal burning. We expected more military firearms and weapons to be surrendered after the operation, and indeed we continue receiving them. My advice is such operations should be sustainable to minimise illegal possession of firearms (Focus Group Discussion, 19th January, 2021).

These findings above reveal overwhelming evidence of the proliferation of military weapons in the study area. The proliferation of military weapons pose national security risks as it increases the potential for armed confrontation. For instance, a study by Ndawana et al., (2018) reveals that East African countries are leaked by conflicts that result in destabilising the security of the region due to rampant illegal firearms in the hands of civilians. In Kenya, for instance, research shows that the Northern Zone is insecure due to military weapons proliferation in the area, mainly from South Sudan and Somalia finding ways to Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps (Grindheim, 2013). The camps serve as trans-shipment point centres for importing firearms and military weapons from Somalia and Sudan (Ibid.). During FGD, it was revealed that:

In general, if we compare our security with other neighbouring countries, our security is better, but in reality, our security is in a dilemma emanating from integrating and naturalising refugees”. “...You know in the caravan of monitor lizards, there are also crocodiles (Focus Group Discussion, 19th January 2021).

The findings imply that the security risks emanating from IR settlements, particularly Katumba Old Settlement, cannot be underestimated. Military weapons are not meant for civilians but for military establishments. Such weapons being in the hands of civilians risk not only the security of the host country but also IRs’ country of origin. The weapons may be used for economic gain, like illicit arms market or as criminal motivators, making it difficult to predict future security within the country (Anthony, 1998).

The possession of illegal weapons in the study area contravenes the Tanzania Firearms and Ammunition Control Act, No. 2 of 2015 specifically Part 111 concerning the possession of firearms and ammunition. Part 111-a, stipulates, “A person must have a licence or permit that justifies ownership of the firearms and ammunition” (URT, 2015). Thus, illegal possession of firearms among IRs increases national security risks. Although some scholars such as Milner, (2000) and Klein (2021) would contend that domestic radicalism by IRs in the host country is conditioned by the host country’s social perception and economic competition, illegal possession of firearms in such high numbers cannot be justified. Thus, national security risks are likely not only from the host’s perception but also IRs’ conduct. For instance, a report by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies mentioned that the coup attempt in 2015 in Burundi led to over 420,600 Burundian refugees fleeing their country with an estimated 100,000 to 300,000 firearms (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018). Refugees do not easily surrender their arms and most of the firearms in the hands of civilians are owned illegally
Refugee Integration

Threats to national security are heightened especially if those arms fall in the hands of violent extremists and radical religious fundamentalists.

4.2 Integrated Refugees and Conflicts in Burundi

National security risks were also assessed by studying the probability of IRs engaging in supporting conflicts in their country of origin. Such behaviour may pose a national security risk as it is likely to affect relations between Tanzania and Burundi. Some studies have shown that although Tanzania has maintained good relations with its neighbours, in the past, Burundi has made the oft-repeated and of-refuted claim that Tanzania was harbouring, training and arming rebels (Rutinwa & Kamanga, 2003). When asked to comment on the statement whether IRs were supporting conflicts in Burundi, the findings divulge a non-significant difference between the opinions of the IRs and NTs regarding IRs supporting conflicts in Burundi $\chi^2 (4) = 8.9878, p > .05$. As indicated in Table 2 about 28.2% of the IRs disagreed, 47.09% were neutral and 24.71% agreed that IRs were supporting conflicts in Burundi. Similarly, 9.44% of NTs disagreed, 60.38% remained neutral and 30.19% agreed that IRs were supporting conflicts in Burundi, with an overall Mean of 3.0076, SD = .8689.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Some IRs Support Conflict in Burundi</th>
<th>IRs f %</th>
<th>NTs f %</th>
<th>Total f %</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>3.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>24.42</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.55</td>
<td>22.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>47.09</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>60.38</td>
<td>48.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>20.06</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26.42</td>
<td>20.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>4.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: IRs Supporting Conflicts in Burundi

Although most of the respondents (48.87%) were unsure if some of the activities by some IRs support conflicts in Burundi, aggregating those who agreed and those who strongly agreed with the statement makes 25.44%. This shows that about a quarter of the respondents believed IRs support conflicts in Burundi. This is significant given the secretive nature of such activities. A larger percentage (48.87%) of “not sure” responses suggest something suspicious. Interview responses by elderly informants among IRs confirm the suspicion, as he hinted:

Here people live along tribal lines and do their activities in a concealed manner adding that, because of the nearness between Burundi and Tanzania good and bad acts may be done² (In-depth interview no. 7, 3rd November 2020).

The study also discovered that some IRs collect weapons and send them back to Burundi to support the anti-Tutsi movement. Proximity between Tanzania, especially Katumba and Burundi facilitates continuity of interactions and networking between IRs with their relatives and friends from Burundi to Katumba and vice versa (Laurent, 2023). The views of this particular respondent were very revealing on this:

I am not sure about supporting conflict in Burund but some of us do not honour our agreement after attaining our citizenship in Tanzania. I hear that a few of us still engage in Burundi conflicts and in other issues which are not good ... Because some of us view
A.K. Laurent & L. Ndumbaro

themselves as Hutu living in Burundi. It is bad! Some of the parents advise their children to be part of Burundi conflicts. The problem is that Hutu and Tutsi don’t forgive and forget easily. Indeed, we don’t! … I think a few of us have been participating in Burundi conflicts although some of them not directly. For example, in Mishamo Old Settlement more IRs have been joining sides that fuel conflicts in Burundi because they are power mongers. Life is not perfect for them if they do not become political leaders (In-depth interview no. 16, 12th October 2020).

The above-quoted views of one of the interviewed IR elders indicate that allegations of some IRs engaging in supporting conflicts in Burundi cannot be entirely dismissed. When the interviewee was probed to clarify about those “other issues”, he mentioned as “not good” said some of them own two citizenship identifications, Tanzania’s and Burundi’s Karangamuntu5. Owning another country’s citizenship IDs is against Tanzania’s citizenship laws since dual citizenship is not endorsed in Tanzania. Possession of IDs of different nationalities questions the loyalty and patriotism of some IRs. It also means that a person can commit a crime in one country and run to hide in another. It may also suggest some’s engagement in espionage. This by itself is a recipe for national security risk in Tanzania.

The findings above demonstrate that IRs continue interacting with some groups in their country of origin. Although the evidence of IRs’ direct engagement in the Burundi conflict is inconclusive, the findings suggest a high probability of IRs engaging in such conflicts. From the perspective of national security, uncovered evidence cannot be ignored. The observed conditions may accelerate fragile relations and security instability in the region or trigger diplomatic challenges between Tanzania and IR’s country of origin, see e.g., (Rutinwa & Kamanga, 2003). Also, prolonged ethnic tensions and rivalries in Burundi may motivate the naturalised refugees in Katumba to support their ethnic groups in Burundi to enable them to become politically dominant. Such a practice is not new in Burundi. A study by Fransen & Ong’ayo (2010) reveals that a minority of Tutsi Burundians living in the Netherlands have been supporting their ethnic group in Burundi to fight the Hutu majority through the provision of remittances.

Sending money back to the country of origin could have positive effects, provided that they are controlled and routed through suitable channels. Otherwise, it may trigger accusations and diplomatic woes. When this is accompanied by IR’s giving support to armed groups, it can generate unnecessary diplomatic tensions between the two nations. For instance, some researchers have reported that in January 2002, three Tanzanian villages close to the Burundi border were attacked by the Burundian army (Loescher & Milner, 2005; Miletzk, 2014). Back in 1997, CNN reported that Burundi accused Tanzania of supporting a rebel group and launching a cross-border attack6 Such accusations/attacks emanating from refugee situations and may trigger a serious security crisis.

5 Karangamuntu is Rundi language which in Burundi it connotes to a Person’s Identification Card
Refugee Integration

study concludes that these instances pose significant national security risks. The potential risks include triggering diplomatic tensions between Tanzania and naturalised refugees’ country of origin and increasing costs of countering armed crime and extreme violence within the country. In line with the Regional Security Complex Theory, this study concludes that the proximity factor between the settlement of naturalised refugees and their country of origin contributes to national security risks. The study recommends that while Tanzania should never abandon its historical legacy and pan-Africanist spirit of harbouring and defending Africa’s human dignity, it needs a sustainable strategy that not only addresses immediate and temporary security threats of mass naturalisation but also promotes stability and resilience in the long term. This may include re-evaluating the current approach to refugee integration, improving security models and resettlement plans and implementing cultural integration strategies.

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